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In the last few decades, terrorism has mainly involved attacks on economic or political 
interests of rich and democratic countries perpetrated by nationals from developing countries 
(Krueger and Laitin, 2003).
1 Terrorism thus has an important international dimension, as most 
incidents relate a target country to a different source country, and that relationship is typically 
asymmetrical. The two countries involved have vastly different levels of economic and 
political development. Often, the terrorist attack takes place in yet another host country, 
which Drakos and Gofas (2006) call the “venue”. Therefore, the target country is not 
necessarily in a position to defend its interests directly, and must delegate part of its anti-
terrorist activity to one or several governments, unless it deliberately infringes on the latter’s 
sovereignty. This inter-governmental relationship has generally been neglected in the 
literature devoted to the fight against terrorism. The latter has mainly addressed the issues of 
self-protection against terrorist attacks (see Enders and Sandler, 2006) and of “crackdown”. 
One exception is Azam and Delacroix (2006), who suggest that foreign aid is important for 
inducing local governments to fight terrorism within their sphere of influence. They first bring 
out a surprising empirical relationship where the aid flow received by a country is positively 
correlated with the number of terrorist attacks flowing from it, after controlling only for the 
recipient country’s level of income per capita and population size. Furthermore, they provide 
a simple theoretical analysis and an econometric test showing that the latter relationship is not 
a structural equation but an equilibrium locus relating two endogenous variables. This result 
and its theoretical underpinnings suggest that donor countries are actively using foreign aid as 
a tool in the war on terror. Within that framework, the donor community is allocating aid 
                                                 
1 Kurrild-Klitgaard et al.  (2006) confirm that democracies tend to be the target of terrorist attacks, with a 
quadratic effect reaching a maximum at very high levels of democracy. Beyond that point, more democracy 
reduces the number of attacks. They also show that democracy reduces the probability that a terrorist attack 
originates in any given country. By contrast, Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2007) show that political rights are 




across countries to provide (among other things) stronger incentives for fighting terrorism to 
governments facing more militant groups. They then show that a few dummy variables are 
sufficient for controlling somewhat for “militancy” and producing a structural equation 
including a negative impact of aid on the supply of attacks by source countries. The present 
paper presents a more satisfactory structural-form equation, with a richer theoretical 
framework, explaining better the role of aid in the fight against terrorism. It presents some 
stronger estimates for the role of aid and brings out the impact of secondary school enrollment 
in reducing the number of terrorist attacks by country of origin.  
This debate about the role of foreign aid in the war on terror emerged recently at the 
highest political level. George W. Bush advocated its use as a tool against terrorism in a much 
cited speech in Monterrey on March 22, 2002. He then said: “We fight against poverty 
because hope is an answer to terror” (cited in Krueger and Maleckova, 2003, p.119). This idea 
was echoed in various quarters of the U.S. administration, as well as in academia, and some of 
its implications were drawn for strengthening aid policy. The Millennium Challenge Account 
was created as a new tool for channeling aid to poor countries in the wake of that speech. 
Alan Krueger criticized this proposition in an influential op-ed published in the New York 
Times (Krueger, 2003). The bottom line of his criticism is that poverty does not seem to be 
the main determinant behind terrorist attacks. The survey data presented in Krueger and 
Maleckova (2003), as well as in Krueger and Laitin (2003), show in fact that terrorists from 
different movements, including the Hezbollah, are predominantly recruited from a relatively 
wealthy and educated family background. Similarly, the biographies of Al-Qaeda’s activists 
analyzed by Sageman (2004) show that they generally have a high level of education, mostly 
in scientific or technical disciplines. Hassan (2001) describes a sample of Hamas volunteers 
with a similar background. Moreover, she shows that they are given some intensive religious 
training after having enrolled for a suicide mission. Some other insights on the profiles of 
terrorists can be gleaned from Bloom (2005), Reuter (2004) and Stern (2003). The emerging  
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picture is that terrorists are men and women in their twenties with some post-secondary 
training, mostly in technical or engineering education. Hence, the microeconomic evidence 
refutes a simple view that poverty breeds terrorism, because terrorists are not recruited among 
the poorest segments of their society of origin. A simple reading of these results would 
suggest instead that wealth and education exert a positive influence on the decision to engage 
in terrorist attacks. Similarly, Paz (2000) documents the fact that higher education expanded 
throughout the West Bank and Gaza at the time when the Hamas and Islamic Jihad were 
gaining popular support. However, the supply of skilled jobs was not expanding in proportion, 
raising some doubt about the significance of this co-movement. Nevertheless, this debate is 
bearing on a fundamental aspect of the relationships between the North and the South. It 
raises the issue of the continuation of foreign aid, insofar as it is supposed to support 
education and contribute to growth, while the global fight against terrorism is dominating 
international relations. The present paper aims at contributing some additional arguments in 
this debate, using both theoretical and empirical analysis.  
President Bush advanced a different line of defense for his views about poverty and 
terrorism in September 2002. In a New York Times op-ed published on September 11 he 
wrote: “Poverty does not transform poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet, poverty, 
corruption and repression are a toxic combination in many societies, leading to weak 
governments that are unable to enforce order or patrol their borders and are vulnerable to 
terrorist networks and drug cartels” (cited in Krueger and Maleckova, 2003, p.140). This 
statement identifies the government as the crucial actor whose behavior creates the link 
between economic conditions and terrorism. However, his use of the expression “weak 
government” might be misleading. Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Krueger and Laitin 
(2003) have found that repressive states are typical of the countries of origin of the 
perpetrators in a cross-country regression estimated over the period 1997-2002. This raises a 
semantic issue, as one can make a case that strong states don’t need repression, and are better  
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equipped for securing civil liberties for their citizens. However, one potential concern with 
these findings that civil liberties have a negative impact on the supply of terrorist events is the 
endogeneity issue. Arguably, there probably are highly militant groups in the countries from 
which many terrorists originate, which might in turn lead their governments to adopt a 
repressive behavior. Frey (2004) argues that the government is facing a tradeoff between 
using repressive counter-terrorism measures (“the stick”) and relying on more social spending 
for reducing the social support to the terrorists (“the carrot”). More militant groups might care 
less for social support, especially if they have external sponsors (Siqueira and Sandler, 2006), 
thus pushing the government to choose more repressive methods. Hence, the presence of a 
repressive government and the supply of terrorists might in fact be jointly determined by the 
same cause, namely a high level of militancy among some groups in the population. The 
present paper draws two lessons from this debate, namely that a careful analysis of the role of 
the government is needed for understanding the links between aid and terrorism, and that the 
endogeneity issue is crucial for a proper empirical diagnosis. 
The empirical analysis of the number of terrorist events has become a very active field 
of research. Todd Sandler has pursued this line of research over about two decades with 
various co-authors, and has published recently a synthesis of his findings (Enders and 
Sandler, 2006). These results have brought out the time-series properties of terrorist events, 
and shown the effectiveness of various countermeasures used by the West. They raise the 
issue of deflection, whereby self-protection by some countries diverts the flow of terrorist 
attacks to other countries. Krueger and Laitin (2003) and Krueger and Maleckova (2003) have 
focused instead on the flow of terrorist attacks originating from different countries and found 
that the key determinant is the presence of a repressive state in the source country. They 
underplay the role of economic variables, supporting the view that political determinants are 
more important. Similarly, Testas (2004) focuses on political repression rather than on income 
per capita, which he finds marginally significant or insignificant in a sample of Muslim  
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countries. He finds that the impact of political repression on the supply of terrorist events is 
non-monotonic, as both low and high levels of repression have a positive impact. Abadie 
(2006) also finds a non monotonic impact of the lack of political rights, using the World 
Market Research Center’s Global Terrorism Index as the dependent variable. This is a risk 
rating index produced by an international risk agency. However, Azam and Delacroix (2006) 
suggest that political repression and the supply of terrorist attacks are jointly determined, both 
responding positively to the unobserved level of “militancy” prevailing in some groups in the 
source country. However, although terrorists are found in the upper tail of the income 
distribution, as mentioned above, some empirical studies suggest that the occurrence of 
terrorist attacks is negatively correlated with shifts of that distribution. Several empirical 
papers have shown that economic downturns are significant for explaining upsurges of 
terrorist attacks (Blomberg et al. 2004, Li, 2005). Hence, the macroeconomic evidence seems 
to contradict the findings emerging from individual data. Moreover, Basuchoudhary and 
Shughart (2007) find that it is economic freedom and secure property rights that reduce the 
number of terrorist attacks by source countries, rather than political rights. Lastly, Azam and 
Delacroix (2006) suggest that these analyses suffer from an omitted-variable bias, as Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) is significant in their own structural equation. Hence, even if 
foreign aid was ineffective in raising the recipient’s national income or its level of education, 
it could have an impact by some other channels. The present paper offers a possible solution 
to this problem. 
Frey et al. (2006) have criticized the standard practice of counting the number of 
terrorist events for adding up some very heterogeneous events. They argue that evaluating 
their costs would provide a more relevant measure of the severity of terrorist activity that 
would offer a more sensible way for computing an aggregate index. Crain and Crain (2006) 
provide an estimate of the GDP losses entailed by terrorism, suggesting that counter-terrorism 
has a high social return. Moreover, Frey et al. (2006) show that non-economic losses  
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represent a significant component of the social cost of terrorist events. A more lethal event 
would reduce life satisfaction by a larger amount than a less lethal one, over and above any 
economic loss experienced by the survey respondents. Hence, a correct measurement of the 
damage inflicted by the terrorist events would give more weight to the more lethal and violent 
attacks, focusing attention on the most damaging ones. Nevertheless, an empirical analysis of 
the number of events originating in each country remains a useful task to perform in order to 
identify the possible policy handles available for reducing their flow. The measurement of the 
social cost of terrorism is probably more relevant for the target or the host country than for the 
source country, which is the aim of the analysis presented below. We focus here on the cross-
country determinants of the number of terrorist attacks by country of origin. 
The individual-level findings described above about the impact of wealth on terrorism 
also raise a major challenge to rational-choice theorists. Higher wealth and education increase 
the opportunity cost of taking risk in perpetrating a terrorist attack, and still do not deter those 
who cross the line. Three main arguments have been offered to reconcile this finding with 
rationality. The first one is based on the assumption of rationing on the volunteers’ market; 
there is an excess supply of volunteers for terrorist missions, and the organizations pick the 
most educated ones, likely to be more efficient than the others. Bueno de Mesquita (2005) has 
developed this line of analysis, suggesting that policies improving the economic situation, 
including, perhaps, foreign aid, could nevertheless play a favorable part in reducing 
mobilization and violence. His model predicts that we could observe both the micro-result 
described above that terrorists have an above-average educational level, and the opposite 
macro-level effect, namely that an increase in the general level of education in the population 
could reduce the supply of terrorist attacks. This would work indirectly, through a reduced 
level of mobilization impacting on the terrorist organization’s incentives. A different 
argument is used by Azam (2005), assuming that terrorists are motivated by altruism towards 
the next generation. People with a lower rate of time preference will invest more resources in  
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education, and will also be more willing to sacrifice their own lifes for the sake of the future 
generation. Hence, the effect of education on the opportunity cost of putting one’s life at risk 
might be offset by its positive impact on inter-generational altruism. That model suggests that 
some types of aid policies might be effective against terrorism, depending on the effect that 
they have on the tradeoff facing the potential terrorists. Here as well, the impact of a higher 
level of education in the population on the supply of attacks cannot be signed unambiguously, 
while the most educated ones would still be more involved than the others. Berman and Laitin 
(2005), Ferrero (2006) and Wintrobe (2006) provide a third line of argument, and analyze 
instead the social pressure dimension of the decision to opt for suicide bombing. More 
educated people would be more sensitive to some kind of social pressure, especially when 
they are students living far away from their families. They then tend to create a closed circle 
with other students. Sageman (2004) illustrates this phenomenon with examples from Al-
Qaeda activists. The Hamas volunteers described by Hassan (2001) provide a slightly 
different picture, where social pressure is more diffuse and pervasive. However, she shows 
that intensive religious training only comes after the decision to go for a suicide mission has 
been taken. These models do not have strong implications for aid policy. The four papers 
cited above (Azam, Berman-Laitin, Ferrero and Wintrobe) view suicide attacks as the 
ultimate test of the rational-choice approach to terrorism. The present paper does not address 
empirically this issue, but the theoretical framework takes due account of these findings that 
education might have a positive impact on the value that some activists attach to performing a 
terrorist attacks.
2  
The next section briefly reviews the literature on the allocation of foreign aid across 
countries, which suggests that the latter is predominantly determined by political 
considerations, rather than by the aim of fighting poverty per se, despite declarations to the 
                                                 
2 Moreover, all these papers analyze the micro-foundations of terrorism in general, while the present one is 
restricted to transnational terrorism. It seems safe to assume that their predictions extend to this setting as well.  
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contrary. Section 3 presents the simple model that captures the delegation problem involved 
in the fight against transnational terrorism. It is aimed at bringing out the roles of foreign aid 
and education in the war on terror. The empirical results are presented in two steps. Section 4 
presents the data used and a simple estimation of the impact of aid and education on the 
number of attacks originating from each country. Section 5 provides a slightly more 
sophisticated analysis, directed at testing whether an endogeneity bias is present in that 
equation. Section 6 offers some concluding comments. 
 
2. The Political Determinants of the Allocation of Foreign Aid across Countries 
 
As mentioned above, a careful analysis of the role of the government is needed for 
understanding the links between aid and terrorism. This is consistent with the theoretical 
literature on aid, which is largely couched in the framework of the principal-agent model. 
There is now a sizable literature discussing various aspects of aid, which has percolated 
somewhat in the policy debate (e.g., World Bank, 1998). The basic structure of the theoretical 
model of aid views the recipient government as the agent of a foreign power, the donor. Both 
players have some common interest, which is widely assumed to be poverty alleviation, albeit 
with different weights (Adam and O’Connell, 1999, Azam and Laffont, 2003, Svensson, 2000 
and 2003). Any other common interest could be included in the model, without changing the 
basic structure. Then, the aim of the analysis is to bring out the implementation problems 
involved and to discuss solutions that can make aid effective, by the donor’s standards. Azam 
and Saadi-Sedik (2004) go one step further by looking at the foreign power’s choice between 
giving aid and imposing sanctions. They provide a case study of the Iraqi Kurds after the 
“Provide Comfort” operation protected them against Saddam Hussein’s persecution, and 
conclude that they benefited from some economic growth under the allied forces’ military 
shield.  Section 3 uses a simple instance of such a principal-agent model where the donor is 
using the recipient government as a delegate for performing some tasks on its behalf.   
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The empirical literature on the allocation of aid across developing countries takes on 
board the political economy dimension. Aid to developing countries has been increasingly 
delivered as program aid, conditional upon the recipient government undertaking various 
policy reforms. The influential paper by Burnside and Dollar (2000) has brought out that the 
effect of aid must be analyzed while taking due account of some heterogeneity among 
recipient countries. They favor an index of the quality of macroeconomic policies as their 
heterogeneity parameter. However, their results suggest that aid-effectiveness, as measured by 
its impact on growth, is not the key determinant of the allocation of aid across countries. 
Using also cross-country regression analysis, Svensson (1999) shows that aid is more 
effective in affecting growth in more democratic countries, but is not allocated to the latter 
more favorably. This also suggests that aid allocation is governed by other considerations. 
There is thus probably a hidden agenda beside the generous drive to alleviate poverty. 
This issue is analyzed by Alesina and Dollar (2000), who show that colonial history 
and strategic alliances are the main determinants of the amount of aid received. They also 
show that, in the time-series dimension, democratization is often followed by increased aid, 
although there is no significant static effect of democracy. By contrast, Berthélemy and Tichit 
(2004) find a significant positive impact of the Freedom House index of civil liberty and 
political rights, in a panel data analysis over the period 1980-1999, for 137 aid recipient 
countries and 22 bilateral donors. This is confirmed in Berthélemy (2006), using a different 
estimation method. The latter two studies bring out that most bilateral donors are also guided 
by their self-interest in allocating their aid, and in particular by their commercial 
relationships. Fleck and Kilby (2006a) show that the latter play also an important part in 
determining the allocation of U.S. bilateral aid across countries, while more conservative 
presidents are more influenced by commercial interests than more liberal ones. Fleck and 
Kilby (2006b) suggest that such a diagnosis can be extended to the case of the World Bank, 
whose aid-allocation behavior is significantly influenced by U.S. trading and political  
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interests. However, one may wonder whether trading flows are exogenous. Although most 
bilateral donors have formally ruled out tied aid, towards the end of that sample period, some 
implicit and subtle ways of tying aid likely remain in operation. Moreover, aid helps financing 
the trade deficit of developing countries, and this is boosting their imports from industrialized 
donors. Hence, some reverse causation between aid and trade might also be at work. 
Chauvet (2002) looks at the relationship between aid allocation across countries and 
socio-political instabilities. She shows that the aid flow is somewhat directed at governments 
that are under political threat, while it shies away from the threats that are directed more 
specifically at the economy. This is related to the finding by Collier (2007) that a non-
negligible fraction of aid leaks out financing the military, without much effort by donors to 
avoid it, while aid is pretty ineffective at lifting people out of poverty. These results again 
support the view that donors are politically motivated when giving aid, while economic issues 
play a secondary role. Similarly, Azam and Delacroix (2006) show that aid allocation across 
countries is influenced by the donors’ goal of fighting terrorism. 
The present paper also analyzes a political dimension of the allocation of aid across 
countries, by looking at its relationship with terrorism. Instead of looking at the indirect link 
between aid and poverty, and then in turn to the additional link between poverty and 
terrorism, as done in the policy debate mentioned above, we are looking here at the direct link 
between aid and terrorism. 
 
3. The Model 
 
  We model a donor that allocates aid between a number of countries, which are liable 
to produce some terrorist attacks against the donor. In each of these countries, the government 
is able to exert some effort to fight terrorism, at a cost. Then, aid is a way to defray the 
recipient government for this cost of effort. The government’s action exerts its influence on 
the value of a terrorist “hit” for the activists, which also depends on some idiosyncratic  
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“militancy” parameter. Hence, for each country, three players are involved: (i) the terrorist 
group determines the number of attacks perpetrated against the donor, (ii) the local 
government exerts some effort to deter these actions, while (iii) the donor provides some aid 
for compensating the government. This model is an extension of the one presented in Azam 
and Delacroix (2006)
3 aimed at capturing the choice between the “carrot” and the “stick” as a 
way of controlling terrorism in the aid-recipient country. 
  The Three Agents 
  We capture this framework using the following specification. Denote Y the given 
income of the donor, A the total amount of aid delivered, and H the total number of terrorist 
attacks hitting the donor and coming from the different countries. Assume that the donor 
incurs a cost  () H ψ  because of these attacks, assumed increasing and convex. Now, denote 
i a  the aid given to country  { } 1,..., in ∈ , and  i h  the number of attacks originating in i. Then, 
by definition,  i i Aa =∑  and  i i Hh =∑ . The donor is also assumed to split its aid flow 
between general budget support to the government denoted  i b  and an amount  i s  which is 
earmarked for supporting education. The latter captures the social concern expressed by the 
donor in its relationship with the recipient government. Hence,  , ii i absi = +∀ . 
 Country  i’s government values the aid flow  i b  as well as the level of human capital 
achieved in the country denoted  i k . The latter produces a level of utility  () i uk  (assumed 
increasing and concave) for the government, which is meant to capture all the positive fallout 
of human capital, built up through education and health, ranging from the improved social 
welfare to the increased fiscal resources that a more skilled population is liable to pay. This 
utility function thus captures both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits that the ruler gets 
from the level of human capital present in his country. The unit cost of producing this level of 
human capital is denoted  () , ii s δ ε , which is decreasing in the donor’s earmarked contribution 
                                                 
3 The working paper version of that paper is longer and more comprehensive than the published one, and is 
available as IDEI Working Paper No. 324 at http://idei.fr.  
 
12
i s  and in the country’s own past investment in human capital, which we call educational 
capital from now on, denoted  i ε . The latter captures all the social and physical infrastructure 
that the country has in the education (and health) sector, including its cultural traditions, its 
schools and universities, as well as its stock of trained teachers, etc. The donor’s earmarked 
contribution to the education sector  i s  is modeled here as reducing the cost of expanding 
human capital borne by the government. This specification entails that such an earmarked 
contribution to the education sector is not perfectly fungible with either local funds or other 
aid flows. This may capture, for example, the use of differentiated inputs like highly qualified 
teachers, without local substitutes, that would not be available without the donor’s 
intervention, or scholarships for joining select institutions abroad. We can thus define the 
government’s profit from human capital investment as: 
 
  () ( ) () ,m a x ,
i ii k i ii i su k s k πε δε =− .         ( 1 )  
 
  It is easily checked that this profit function is increasing in its two arguments, 
reflecting the cost-saving effects of both the local educational capital and the donor’s 
earmarked contribution. Applying Hotelling’s lemma, (1) implies that country i’s human 
capital level may be written as an increasing function of   i s  and  i ε : 
 
() , ii i kk s ε = .            ( 2 )  
 
  The country’s government also incurs a cost  ( ) i r ξ  (assumed increasing and convex) 
when performing an amount  i r  of repression against terrorists, with  ( ) 00 ξ = . Then, the aid 
contract will specify how much repression the local government is expected to perform 
against the terrorists within its sphere of influence in return for the aid received, including the 
earmarked contribution to the education sector. This view of the aid contract captures the idea 
that the foreign power has to delegate part of the protection of its interests against terrorism to 
local governments, using aid as a means of defraying the costs of doing so incurred by the  
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local government. In order for this contract to be acceptable by the latter, the triplet { } ,, iii bsr 
must fulfill the following government’s participation constraint, where we normalize 
() 0, 0 i πε = : 
 
  () ( ) ,0 ii i i bs r πεξ +− ≥ .          ( 3 )  
 
 Let  i h  be the number of attacks perpetrated by country i’s terrorist organization 
against the foreign power’s interests. The terrorist organization attaches a unit value  ( ) ii vk θ  
to these attacks, where  i θ  is the “militancy” parameter, assumed known to both the donor and 
the government, and  ( ) i vk  is an increasing function capturing the positive impact of human 
capital on the value attached by the terrorist organizations to the attacks perpetrated against 
the foreign power’s interests. This positive effect of human capital on the value of terrorist 
attacks for the perpetrators is meant to capture the fact mentioned in the introduction that 
terrorists generally have an above-average education level, as first pointed out by Krueger and 
Maleckova (2003) and Krueger and Laitin (2003). The terrorist organization is also incurring 
a cost  () ,, ii i hkr ω  for perpetrating its attacks. This cost function is naturally assumed to be 
increasing and convex with respect to  i h , and increasing in  i r . The impact of  i k  is less clear-
cut, and probably combines two opposing effects. There is first a positive impact, as more 
educated people have a higher opportunity cost, which the terrorist organization will most 
probably take into account. There is then a second impact going in the other direction, as 
more educated people are probably more efficient at performing the attacks. The latter effect 
has been analyzed by Bueno de Mesquita (2005), as discussed in the introduction. However, 
we do not need to make a firm assumption regarding the marginal effects of repression and 
education on the terrorist organization’s costs, as they do not affect the model’s main 
predictions. The latter only depend on the cross-second partial derivatives, i.e., the impact of 
these variables on the marginal cost of perpetrating an attack for the terrorist organization. It  
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is natural to assume that repression increases the marginal cost of perpetrating an attack. 
Denoting cross-second derivatives by subscripts, this means that  0 hr ω > .  
  The time line of the game is as follows: (i) the donor offers the aid contract described 
above; (ii) the government exerts the agreed level of repression and chooses its preferred 
education level, both assumed to be perfectly observable and contractible by the two parties; 
(iii) the terrorists launch their chosen number of attacks  i h ; and lastly (iv) the aid is delivered 
and consumed. Hence, this game can be solved by backward induction. We first derive the 
terrorist organization’s best-response function, as a function of the government’s policy 
variables. Then, the “attacks supply curve” is derived at the country level, by bringing in the 
government’s preferred mix of repression and education expenditures, taking due account of 
the donor’s influence on that choice.  
  The terrorist organization chooses its level of attacks  i h  with a view to maximizing: 
 
() ( ) ,, ii i i i i vk h hkr θω − .          ( 4 )  
 
Then, its best-response function  ( ) ,, ii i i hh k r θ =  may be derived from the first-order 
condition  () ( ) ,, ii h i i i vk hkr θω = , where  ( ) h ω −  denotes the derivative of the cost with respect 
to the level of attacks.  Denoting  0, 0 and hh hr hk ω ωω >>  the relevant second derivatives 










ih r i i h k ii i
ih h i h h i h h




−− −− ∂∂ ∂
=> = < =
∂− ∂ − ∂ −
.   (5) 
  The signs of the first two partial effects on the left-hand side are fairly intuitive, and 
do not call for much comment: more militant groups produce more attacks, while a greater 
repression effort by the government reduces the number of attacks. The third effect is 
ambiguous, as more human capital increases the value of terrorist attacks while its impact on 
the marginal cost of these attacks is itself ambiguous, as discussed above. As mentioned in the 
introduction, this ambiguity is compatible with the predictions of either Bueno de Mesquita  
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(2005) or Azam (2005) concerning the macro-impact of education on the level of terrorist 
activity. 
  The Attacks Supply Curve 
  Now, the donor will choose its preferred aid contract with a view to maximizing 
() YA H ψ −−  over all countries, subject for each one of them to the terrorists’ best-response 
function  () ,, ii i i hh k r θ = , the government’s preferred human capital investment policy 
() , ii i kk s ε =  and the government’s participation constraint (3), which may be written as: 
 
  () ( ) , ii i i i as s r πεξ ≥− + .          ( 6 )  
 
This problem can be decomposed into two steps: 
(i) Aid composition problem: the efficient attacks supply curve is determined for each 
country by minimizing i h , using  i s  and  i r  as control variables, given the level of  i a , the local 
government’s participation constraint (6), its preferred education policy (2), and the terrorist 
organization’s best response function.
4 
(ii) Aid allocation problem: the donor’s optimal allocation of aid across countries is 
determined by minimizing () AH ψ + , taking all the efficient attacks supply curves as 
constraints.
5 
The donor has no reason to leave any positive rent to the local government, and thus 
(6) will hold with equality. Then, solving simultaneously these three equations allows us to 
establish proposition 1.  
 
Proposition 1: (i) The number of terrorist attacks originating from country i can be written as 
the following attacks supply curve: 
 
                                                 
4 The second-order condition for this problem is messy, and involves second- and third derivatives for which not 
much intuition seems compelling. It requires the terrorists’ best-response function to be quasi-convex in si and ri,, 
after substituting for the employment policy, and the government’s participation constraint to be concave in the 
same space. We simply assume that it holds in the relevant neighbourhood. 
5 The second-order condition required here is not more enlightening than at the previous footnote. It essentially 
requires the efficient attacks supply curves derived at (7) below to be convex in ai.  
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  () ,, ii i i hh a θε = ,           ( 7 )  
 





0, 0 and 0
i ii i i i
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=> = < = − <
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.     (8) 
 
  (ii) The donor’s optimal allocation of aid across countries is determined by setting: 
 
  () { } 1 ' , 1,..., i Hi n λψ =∀ ∈ .         ( 9 )  
 
Proof: Proposition 1 (i) is established by minimizing the terrorists’ best-response function 
() ,, ii i i hh k r θ =  subject to the government’s preferred education policy  () , ii i kk s ε = , and the 
government’s participation constraint written as an equality  () ( ) , ii i i i as s r πεξ =− + . The 
first-order conditions for this problem yield:  
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Then, the first-order condition for the government’s problem (1) can be used to derive 
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which can be substituted in (10). The resulting expression can then be used with the terrorist 
organization’s best response function and the government’s participation constraint to yield 
the derivatives given in (8) by taking their total differential and rearranging the terms. 
Then part (ii) is established by minimizing ( ) AH ψ + , taking all the efficient attacks 
supply curves as constraints. 
 
  A noticeable property of the attacks supply curve, as expressed in (8), is that the signs 
of the impacts of the educational capital and of aid do not depend on the terrorists’  
 
17
parameters, once (9) is taken into account, but only on the cost functions entering the donor’s 
and the government’s objective functions. In particular, the fact that the value attached by the 
terrorists to the attacks  () i vk  was assumed above to be increasing in the level of human 
capital is irrelevant for these predictions. This suggests of course that the observed fact that 
terrorists have an above-average education level mentioned in the introduction is irrelevant 
for aid policy. Proposition 1 tells us that even in that case, more educational capital ends up 
reducing the number of terrorist attacks at the cross-country level, because its effect is more 
than compensated by an adjusted level of repression; for a given aid level, a higher level of 
educational capital allows the local government to reach its human capital objective at a lower 
cost, and thus frees some resources for performing more repression.
6  Hence, for some values 
of the parameters, it is possible that the donor will elicit more repression from the government 
by earmarking more funding to education 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
We test the main predictions of the model described above using a dataset similar to 
the one used by Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Krueger and Laitin (2003), based on the 
same source. We thus focus on the number of terrorist events per country of origin of the 
perpetrators
7. These data are available on the internet, in the database provided by the 
International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). We have extended the sample used 
in the two Krueger et al. papers cited above to cover the period from January 1990 to March 
2004. More precisely, the number of terrorist events is computed from a set of 1119 terrorist 
incidents, taking place between January 1990 and March 2004
8 (Azam and Delacroix, 2006). 
All these events are transnational in that the target and the source countries are different. 
These terrorist attacks are aggregated over the period mentioned above to produce a number 
                                                 
6 The appendix wraps up the theoretical analysis by explaining how the ais and H are jointly determined. 
7 Hence, a terrorist attack perpetrated by two terrorists from different countries is counted as two events. 
8 Alexandra Delacroix has produced this data set when she was a DEA student at Toulouse University.  
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of attacks originating from each country during that period. During the latter, the terrorist 
attacks originated from 80 source countries in our sample, as we have excluded Afghanistan, 
Bosnia, Cuba, Myanmar, Somalia and Yugoslavia, for lack of some data on the explanatory 
variables. Thus, we are left with the source countries of terrorist attacks accounting for 
slightly less than half the 176 countries in our sample. Table A1 in the appendix gives the full 
list of the number of attacks by country of origin used in our estimations. Only 18 countries 
are the source of more than 18 attacks, while 18 countries are the source of only 1 event over 
that period. Not surprizingly, the West Bank and Gaza Strip provide the largest number of 
attacks, with 400 terrorist events originating there. However, the Middle East is not the only 
source of terrorism as Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Europe and Latin America are all 
represented in the top-10 source countries. Many OECD countries are also the source of 
terrorist attacks, including France, the U.K. and the U.S.A.  
The main goal of our empirical analysis is to test the predictions that foreign aid and 
educational capital have a negative impact on the supply of terrorist attacks originating in the 
recipient counntries. We use the standard measure of foreign aid, namely Official 
Development Assistance (ODA). This variable aggregates the disbursements of loans (with a 
high enough grant component) and grants by official agencies of the members of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to promote economic development and welfare in 
the recipient countries. These data are measured in constant 2000 U.S. dollars. In the sample 
used in this article, 24 countries are aid donors, mainly among OECD member countries. The 
model presented above suggests that this is an endogenous variable, insofar as the donor is 
allocating aid with a view to controlling the supply of terrorist attacks from recipient 
countries. Moreover, there is no compelling argument for deciding whether ODA should be 
measured per capita or as a ratio to GDP. While the former specification seems to capture 
better the potential benefits that the country will get from aid, the latter seems more 
appropriate for measuring the need for it. Consequently, we use both specifications in what  
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follows, showing that the standard econometric procedure for choosing between two non-
nested hypotheses is not conclusive in this case. It is less straightforward to find the right 
measure of educational capital in a comparable way across countries. We have chosen to use 
the enrollment rate in secondary education in our main equation, but the appendix presents 
some robustness checks. This variable is thus liable to be endogenous on two accounts. First, 
the theoretical model above predicts that the donor will earmark some funds for influencing 
the decision of the local government to fight terrorism within its sphere of influence by 
reducing the cost of investing in education. Second, this variable is bound to measure 
educational capital inaccurately, and thus to include some measurement error entailing a 
correlation between the included variable and the residuals. Both ODA and secondary school 
enrollment are probably correlated with the level of economic and political development of 
the recipient countries. It is thus important to control for the latter in order to mitigate the risk 
of finding a spurious correlation with aid and education due in fact to under-development. We 
use GDP per capita and population size as controls in our regressions. GDP in constant 2000 
U.S. dollars is divided by midyear population. However, because repression is endogenous in 
our theoretical framework, and optimized out for deriving the structural equation (7), we do 
not include a control variable capturing civil liberty or democracy. The latter are implicitly 
determined by the exogenous variables in the model, like militancy and educational capital, 
and the level of foreign aid. 
The source of data for all these explanatory variables is the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators online (WDI). We use a sample of 176 countries, averaging 
population, GDP per capita, ODA per capita, ODA as a percentage of GDP and secondary 
school enrollment over the period 1990-2004. Table A.2 in the appendix provides some 
summary statistics for these data. ODA per capita is Official Development Assistance divided 
by the midyear population size. A majority of countries have an ODA per capita between 0 
and 50 dollars. Countries receiving more than 100 dollars per capita are the poorest among the  
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developing countries. The majority of countries with a ratio of ODA to GDP higher than 30% 
are in Sub-Saharan Africa. Dummy variables are used for indicating these countries, as a 
check on possible non-linearity or a differential treatment for them by the donors. For 
measuring the level of secondary education, we use the gross enrollment rate, i.e., the ratio of 
total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the relevant age group. The resulting 
ratio can therefore be higher than 100 %. The majority of countries have a gross percentage of 
secondary school enrollment between 90 and 100 % but many countries have a much lower 
rate, especially in developing countries. 
Finally, as emphasized by Azam and Delacroix (2006), it is very important to try to 
control for militancy in order to identify the correct structural equation for the attacks supply 
curve. The crucial element of their identification strategy is the sign of the impact of aid, 
which is negative in the structural equation, while there is a positive correlation across 
countries if no attempt is made to control for militancy. We follow the same route here and 
use some dummy variables as proxies for capturing this unobserved variable.
9 After a little 
experimentation, the following dummy variables turned out to be useful: West Bank and 
Gaza, Camp David (Egypt and Israel), China and India, Latin American countries, ASEAN 
countries before 1990 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), OECD 
countries before 1990, Sub-Saharan African  countries and former USSR countries. Of 
course, these dummy variables also control for other country characteristics that may affect 
the supply of terrorist attacks, like geography and civilization. Moreover, these variables can 
also capture some effects of the educational capital that are not captured by the secondary 
school enrollment rate. 
The attack supply curve cannot be analyzed by standard least squares estimation 
because the dependent variable takes only non-negative integer values corresponding to the 
                                                 
9 A potentially useful variable for capturing some aspects of this “militancy” level is the “ethnic tension” index 
that affects significantly the level of terrorist attacks by country of origin in Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2007). 
Testing for this falls outside the scope of the present paper.  
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number of terrorist events, while most countries are the source of no attacks at all. The 
standard methods for analyzing such count data include the Poisson regression and the 
negative binomial model (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986). The latter is less restrictive than the 
former because it has one more free parameter. The assumed equality of the conditional mean 
and variance functions is the most restrictive assumption of the Poisson regression model. The 
negative binomial specification introduces an individual, unobserved effect into the 
conditional mean. According to this model individuals have a constant but unequal 
probability of experiencing an event. We use the latter specification, following McCullagh 
and Nelder (1983). We tested it against the Poisson model, and concluded that the negative 
binomial model is always preferred. Therefore, in the following analysis we only present the 
negative binomial results. 
Both the theoretical model presented above and the econometric results presented in 
Azam and Delacroix (2006) conclude that the number of terrorist events by country of origin 
and the amount of aid are simultaneously determined. However, because it is well known that 
most methods aimed at correcting for the endogeneity bias are liable to reduce the efficiency 
of the estimators, we start the analysis by performing the estimations without taking care of it. 
In the next section, we then test whether these benchmark estimates are misleading by testing 
for the presence of a significant endogeneity bias.  
Table 1 presents two different estimated equations of the number of terrorist events 
originating from each country, estimated on the 176-country sample and where the variable 
ODA is in percentage of GDP. Equation 1 includes population size as a control variable, 
which turns out to be insignificant. Equation 2 then is estimated while excluding population 
from the list of explanatory variables. This does not affect much the other coefficients. These 
equations provide some support for the two maintained hypotheses, as the ratio of ODA to 
GDP and secondary school enrollment have a significant impact with the predicted sign. 
Regarding the other control variables,  per capita GDP shows up with a negative sign. This is  
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consistent with casual observation, which suggests that terrorists mainly come from 
developing countries. As many characteristics of the level of economic and political 
development are known to be correlated with per capita GDP, one should not infer too much 
from this result. It does not imply that per capita income stricto sensu is a key factor in 
explaining the supply of terrorist events. Krueger and Maleckova (2003) have presented a 
strong argument against such a view. Nevertheless, it is a useful control variable to have, in 
order to disentangle the effect of foreign aid from that of under-development. 
 
Table 1: Number of Terrorist Events Originating From Each Country  
(With ODA in Percentage of GDP) 
 
  Equation 1    Equation 2 
Variables Coefficient  z-Statistics  p-value   Coefficient  z-Statistics  p-value 
Intercept  3.454 4.72 0.000    4.382 6.32 0.000 
Population 4.12E-09  1.53 0.127    -  -  - 
GDP p.c.  -1.02E-04  -2.72  0.006    -1.11
E-04 -2.82  0.005 
ODA (% GDP)  -0.088  -3.04  0.002    -0.110  -3.62  0.000 
Secondary enrollment  
(%  gross)  -0.023 -2.45 0.014    -0.030  -3.31 0.001 
West B. Gaza  6.228  2.92  0.003  6.366 2.88 0.004 
"Camp  David" 3.833 2.46 0.014    3.806 2.35 0.019 
Sub-Saharan  -0.519 -0.81 0.415    -0.799  -1.21 0.228 
OECD  2.386 2.62 0.009    2.813 2.81 0.005 
Nb.  Obs.  176       176    
R²  -      0.590    
Pseudo-R²  0.0736       0.064    
LR-Stat  chi2(7  df)  57.63  0.000    50.40  0.000 
 
Note: Equation 1 and 2 are negative binomial regressions estimated by maximum likelihood. 
 
Three of the dummy variables included are significant. The West Bank and Gaza 
dummy variable is an obvious candidate for being used as a proxy for “militancy”. The 
estimates confirm that it is highly significant. The “Camp David” one, which indicates Egypt 
and Israel, also has a significant positive sign, which is less than 2/3 as high as that for the  
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West Bank & Gaza Strip. Lastly, the dummy variable indicating the OECD countries also has 
a significantly positive sign, suggesting the presence of a high degree of militancy over the 
period considered. A glance at table A.1 shows that six OECD countries have produced at 
least six terrorist attacks, including Spain (31), Turkey (28), Greece (11), France (7), Ireland 
(6) and Italy (6). The importance of these dummy variables is confirmed by running these 
estimations without them.
10 The results are shown in the appendix, where the equations run 
without the dummy variables have no significant likelihood ratio tests. Table A.3 presents this 
result for ODA as a percentage of GDP and ODA per capita. Hence, these dummy variables 
contain some relevant information for identifying our equation, although they most probably 
fall short of measuring “militancy” with any accuracy.  
 
Table 2: Number of Terrorist Events Originating From Each Country  
(With ODA per Capita) 
 
  Equation 3    Equation 4 
Variables Coefficient  z-Statistics  p-value   Coefficient  z-Statistics p-value 
Intercept  2.894 4.41 0.000    3.627 5.77 0.000 
Population 3.50E-09  1.60 0.109         
GDP  p.c. -8.02E-05  -2.20 0.027    -7.99E-05  -2.08 0.037 
ODA  p.c.  -0.016 -4.18 0.000    -0.019  -4.85 0.000 
Secondary enrollment 
(% gross)  -0.010 -1.17 0.242    -0.015  -1.67 0.094 
West B. Gaza  8.216  3.79  0.000  8.617 3.84 0.000 
"CampDavid"  6.325022  3.88 0.000    6.663 3.96 0.000 
Sub-Saharan  -0.963 -1.75 0.079    -1.392  -2.58 0.009 
OECD  1.116 1.31 0.191    1.102 1.18 0.236 
Nb.  Obs.  176       176    
R²  -      -    
Pseudo-R²  0.0821       0.073    
LR-Stat  chi2  (7  df)  64.25  0.000    57.47  0.000 
 
Note: Equation 3 and 4 are negative binomial regressions estimated by maximum likelihood. 
 
                                                 
10 The dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa and OECD are kept in the equations presented at tables 1 and 2 
for the sake of comparison and testing because they are significant in either one or the other.  
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Using ODA per capita instead of ODA as a ratio to GDP does not affect much the 
diagnosis, as shown by table 2. The results are qualitatively the same as in the previous case, 
the same coefficients being significant with the same sign. Hence, we can draw the same 
conclusion regarding ODA and secondary education, although the latter is only significant at 
the 10 % level when the insignificant population size is dropped, while it is not significant 
otherwise. Another difference is that now, it is the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy which is 
significant, while the OECD one becomes insignificant. Over the period 1990-2004 very few 
African countries are concerned with terrorism, while socio-political instabilities of another 
kind are endemic, including coup d’etat, civil wars and riots. One can observe that the 
majority of countries concerned by terrorist activities were not undergoing a civil war. 
Hence, both equations lead to the same conclusion, namely that ODA, under both 
specifications, the secondary school enrollment rate, and GDP per capita negatively affect the 
supply of terrorist events by country of origin. These results shed some light on the lessons 
drawn from the microeconomic data discussed in the introduction. Even if terrorists are 
predominantly recruited among the relatively wealthy and educated social strata, as 
mentioned above, the secondary school enrollment rate and GDP per capita have a negative 
influence on the number of international terrorist events perpetrated by individuals from each 
country. This seemingly contradictory result is one of the predictions of the theoretical model 
presented above, and these empirical results thus provide some support for the latter.  
The overall performance of these equations seems relatively weak, when looking at 
the pseudo-
2 R s, but the likelihood ratio tests accept the overall significance of the 
equations.
11 Moreover, we tried to choose between the two specifications presented using the 
J-test proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1982) for choosing between two non-nested 
models. The idea is that if one model is the correct one, then the fitted values from the other 
                                                 
11 We ran some of these regressions using both Stata and E-Views, and found much higher pseudo-R
2 with the 
latter. We just present here the smaller of the two, for the sake of remaining on the safe side.  
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model should not have any explanatory power when estimating the former. The first step is to 
estimate both models separately. The second step is to use the predicted dependent variable 
from model 2 as an auxiliary variable in model 1 (and vice versa). The third step consists of 
re-estimating model 1 and test whether or not the auxiliary variable makes a significant 
contribution to the explanation of the dependent variable. If this is true, the second model 
contains some relevant information not contained in the first model. In our analysis, we 
conclude that neither of the two models is preferred. We cannot choose between a model with 
ODA per capita or ODA as a percentage of GDP. Therefore, in the following section, we keep 
using these two models. Finally, we also performed a number of robustness checks. We use 
the gross tertiary school enrollment ratio instead of secondary education in table A.3. As 
mentioned above, the available evidence suggests that most of the terrorists have acquired 
some post-secondary education. Therefore, testing the impact of tertiary education is 
potentially an important check on the relevance of the model. The sample size is reduced to 
164 countries. The results are qualitatively unchanged. We obtain roughly the same 
conclusion about the signs of the coefficients and their significance as with secondary 
education, although its significance level is lower. In particular, it is only significant at the 
10% level when population size is dropped. Therefore, in our sample, the tertiary or the 
secondary education have roughly the same influence on terrorist activities. 
    The  results  of  the  foregoing  section were estimated without correcting for 
endogeneity, but the next section shows that controling for that does not change significantly 
the diagnosis. 
 
5. Controling for Endogeneity 
 
We now test for endogeneity bias, using a version of the Hausman test. This procedure 
has two stages. First, a reduced-form equation is estimated for each endogenous variable, 
using exogenous variables as regressors. Then, the resulting residuals are computed and  
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included in the initial model. If the residuals are jointly significant according to an F-test, then 
there is a significant endogeneity bias in the initial estimates. Moreover, adding these 
residuals to the equation allows to retrieve the unbiased coefficients, as shown by Blundell 
and Powell (2003) in a much more general setting. 
The Reduced Form ODA Equations 
In our setting, we first use the residuals from a Tobit regression explaining the amount 
of ODA per capita or that of ODA as a ratio to GDP for each country. Indeed, because our 
sample includes developed and developing countries, while only the latter receive any aid, 
this dependent variable is truncated at zero. In table 3, equation 5 is a reduced form equation 
aiming at explaining the level of ODA as a percentage of GDP with only exogenous variables 
and equation 6 the level of ODA per capita. We first use some economic variables, namely 
per capita GDP and population size which explain to some extent the need for aid. We include 
also a series of dummy variables, aimed mainly at controling for “militancy” and “educational 
capital”, the two exogenous parameters emphasized in the theoretical model. These dummy 
variables also control for several other country characteristics that might be relevant in the 
reduced-form ODA equation, like “civilization” and “historical ties” to colonial powers that 
are liable to affect the allocation of foreign aid across countries. The “China and India” 
variable helps us to control for any non-linear population size effect. ASEAN indicates 
members which joined that organization before 1990. This group represents potentially a 
“civilization” effect, as do “Latin America & Carribeans”, “Sub Saharan Africa” and USSR. 
OECD and “Camp David” have already been used above for capturing certain “militancy” 
aspects. In addition, we add the under-5 infant mortality rate as an instrument for educational 
capital. This is a slow-moving indicator of human capital, which turns out to be significant in 
the reduced-form education equation. 
Population and GDP per capita are significant with a negative sign in both equations 5 
and 6, in agreement with conventional wisdom, while the infant mortality rate is significant  
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with a positive sign in equation 5 only.
12 The USSR variable is significant in equations 5 and 
6 with a negative sign. So, during the period covered here, these countries seem to be 
discriminated against in terms of the amount of aid received, probably for cold-war related 
reasons. The Sub-Saharan Africa dummy is not significant in either equation, suggesting that 
these countries do not get more aid, as a ratio of GDP or per capita, than the rest of the world, 
after controling for per capita GDP, population size, and infant mortality. The “Camp David” 
countries, Egypt and Israel, and the West Bank & Gaza Strip get more aid per capita than the 
others, given the controls included, but this is not significant when ODA is taken as a 
percentage of GDP.  
 
Table 3: Reduced-Form ODA 
 
  Equation 5 : ODA % of GDP  Equation 6 : ODA p.c. 
  Coefficient z-Statistic  p-value  Coefficient z-Statistic  p-value 
Intercept 8.973  4.100  0.000 113.58 7.31 0.000 
Population -7.20E-08 -2.80  0.005  -6.42E-07 -3.60  0.000 
GDP p.c.  -0.001  -2.85  0.004  -0.005 -3.06 0.002 
Under 5 Mortality 
Rate (per 1000)  0.054  2.59  0.010  -0.224 -1.56 0.119 
ASEAN -1.430  -0.28  0.778 -27.672 -0.79 0.431 
"Camp David"  0.010  0.001  0.999  96.866 1.85 0.064 
China and India  66.734  2.33  0.020  610.298 3.08 0.002 
Latin America  -3.837  -1.61  0.108  -9.420 -0.57 0.570 
OECD -16.321  -2.53  0.011  -141.845 -3.35  0.001 
USSR -5.756  -1.81  0.071  -59.628 -2.70 0.007 
Sub-Saharan -0.836  -0.28 0.776  -10.968 -0.538 0.591 
West B. & Gaza  9.179  0.87  0.381  150.853 2.07 0.038 
Nb. Obs.  176      176    
R² 0.296    0.240    
LR chi2(11)  105.90    0.000  92.13    0.000 
 
Note: these equations have been estimated by a Tobit regression. 
 
                                                 
12 The coefficient of GDP p.c. is very small, but highly significant. This coefficient is not unit-free, and its small 
size only reflects the fact that the aid to GDP ratio is a small number relative to GDP p.c.  
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Reduced-Form Equation Explaining the Secondary-School Enrollment Rate 
To explain the secondary school enrollment rate, we use an ordinary least squares 
regression. The dependent variable is the average ratio of secondary school enrollment over 
the period 1990-2004. We include the same explanatory variables as in the ODA equation: 
population, per capita GDP, under-5 infant mortality rate and dummy variables. The resulting 
model is globally significant. 
 
Table 4: Reduced-Form Secondary School Enrollment Ratio 
 
  Equation 7 
Variable Coefficient  t-Statistic  p-value 
Intercept 82.87  29.97  0.000 
Population -1.95E-08  -0.610  0.543 
GDP p.c.  0.000  1.74  0.084 
Infant Mortality  -0.305  -9.88  0.000 
ASEAN -7.194  -0.94  0.348 
"Camp David"  11.81  1.03  0.305 
China and India  15.318  0.42  0.673 
Latin America  -0.788  -0.216  0.829 
OECD 20.778  3.49  0.001 
Sub-Saharan -5.904  -1.31  0.191 
USSR 20.101  4.16  0.000 
West B. & Gaza  9.307  0.58  0.562 
Nb. Obs.  176     
R² 0.78     
Prob (F-statistic)  0.000     
 
Note: Equation 7 is a least square regression estimated by maximum likelihood. 
 
The population variable has no significant impact on the level of secondary school 
enrollment, while GDP per capita is significant at the 10 % level only. The infant mortality 
rate has a highly significant negative impact, suggesting that health and education are moving 
in the same direction. Given population size, per capita GDP and infant mortality, OECD and 
USSR countries have a positive significant impact while the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy has 
a negative but insignificant coefficient. These signs do not come as a surprise, while the poor  
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but insignificant African performance suggests that the substandard educational performance 
achieved in that continent is explained by the control variables included. 
Final Test Controling for Endogeneity 
 
Table 5: Controling for Endogeneity 
 
  Equation 8    Equation 9 
Variables Coefficient  z-Statistics p-value  Coefficient z-Statistics p-value 
Intercept  8.91  3.84 0.000    5.993  5.29 0.000 
GDP  p.c.  -7.98E-05 -2.11 0.035    -5.82E-05 -1.60 0.110 
ODA (% GDP)  -0.244  -2.55  0.011    -  -  - 
ODA p.c.  -  -  -    -0.027  -3.07  0.002 
Secondary Enrollment  (% 
gross)  -0.080  -3.61 0.000    -0.042  -3.50 0.001 
West B. Gaza  8.525  3.57  0.000   10.488 4.09  0.000 
"Camp  David"  4.343  2.83 0.005    7.708  4.65 0.000 
Sub-Saharan  -2.286  -3.17 0.002    -2.909  -4.48 0.000 
OECD  3.016  3.17 0.002    1.207  1.24 0.213 
Endog. Bias. Secondary  0.074  3.05  0.002    0.052  3.11  0.002 
Endog. Bias ODA (% of GDP)  0.138  1.31  0.190    -  -  - 
Endog, Bias ODA p.c.  -  -  -    0.009  0.92  0.358 
Nb.  Obs.  176      176   
Pseudo-R²  0.080       0.088    
LR-Stat  chi2(9)  62.70   0.000    69.15   0.000 
Endogeneity F-test  (2,  165) 5.79   0.004    5.27   0.006 
 
Note: Equations 8 and 9 are negative binomial regressions estimated by maximum likelihood. 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the test for endogeneity bias. We add the residuals from 
equations 5, 6 and 7 in tables 3 and 4, as appropriate, and their estimated coefficients provide 
estimates of the endogeneity bias for the corresponding variables. We find that the latter is 
significant for the secondary school enrollment rate and not for ODA, taken individually. 
However, the more relevant F-test for joint significance of the two added residuals confirms 
the presence of some endogeneity bias, in agreement with the theoretical framework presented 
above. Furthermore, for each of these variables, the sum of the estimated coefficient and the 
estimated bias adds up to almost the same number as the estimated coefficients for the same  
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variables in equations 2 and 4, with the exception of the coefficient for Secondary Education 
in equation 9. This suggests that the addition of the residuals from the reduced-form equations 
are doing a pretty good job at controling for endogeneity. Then, the estimated coefficients of 
ODA, either as a percentage of GDP or per capita, and that of secondary education in 
equation 8, are pretty close to the unbiased estimates. Hence, these results provide some 
support for the model presented above. The results of equation 9 are more ambiguous, as the 
estimated bias for secondary education suggests that the correction for endogeneity is less 
accurate. Nevertheless, the estimated (unbiased now) coefficient is still negative and 




The empirical analysis performed in this paper provides some support for the views 
captured in the theoretical model presented above. This suggests that foreign aid is used 
(among other things) as a means to induce local governments to fight terrorism within their 
sphere of influence and thus to protect the political and economic interests of the donors. One 
of the key benefits of this approach against terrorism is that by reducing the flow of attacks at 
the source, it creates some positive externalities for the other potential targets. This is at 
variance with the seemingly more obvious self-protection approach, which creates negative 
externalities for the other potential targets, by diverting the flow of attacks onto them, as 
emphasized by Enders and Sandler (2006). Moreover, the model and the empirical results 
suggest that the donors can usefully earmark some of that aid for supporting the education 
sector. The theoretical model presented above helps us to understand why this result does not 
contradict the evidence found in various statistical data that terrorists are predominantly 
recuited among people from a relatively wealthy and educated background. What matters for 
the impact of foreign aid and education on the supply of terrorist attacks by country of origin 
is their effect on the government’s behavior. The fact that there seems to be some correlation  
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between the level of education of the individuals engaged in terrorism and their activism is 
irrelevant from the donor’s point of view, as the local government will adjust its level of 
repression optimally as a function of the impact of education. Hence, beyond education per 
se, the model suggests that the donor can profitably earmark some funding for some activity 
that the recipient government values if its contribution is not perfectly fungible.   
We thus found that aid can be pretty effective, and this stands in sharp contrast to the 
received wisdom from the so-called “aid-ineffectiveness” literature, which Easterly (2006) 
has recently surveyed. Our results thus help redress the confusion on which that literature is 
based, namely that aid is deemed “ineffective” because it is not achieving the objectives that it 
is not really trying to achieve. The proper methodology of economics is rather to infer from 
the data what objectives are being pursued, in the spirit of ‘revealed preference’ theory. Many 
foreign rulers of the past have used various means for protecting their interests abroad by 
inducing local regimes to act on their behalf. The most illuminating example is probably 
given by the Republic of Venice, which built a trading empire in the Mediterranean world in 
the late Middle Ages, between the thirteenth and the fifteenth centuries, while delegating to 
local rulers, and in particular the Byzantine Emperor, the task of protecting its traders by 
providing gifts and other incentives. The rich countries of the modern world have walked in 
their footsteps, on a much larger scale, coining the expression “foreign aid” as the name given 






A.1: Joint Determination of the  i a s and H  
 
  Define the aggregate supply of terrorist attacks as: 
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which can be solved to get  () ,, ii i aa H θε = . 
 Then,  equilibrium  H  is found as the fixed point of the mapping: 
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  If we assume that the second-order conditions hold everywhere, then this fixed-point 
exists and is unique, because the mapping (A.3) is monotonically decreasing in H  as 






Table A.1: Number of Events per Source Country (1990:01-2004:03) 
 
Country  Number  Country  Number Country Number 
West  Bank  400  Bahrain  7 Kuwait 2 
India 227  Ethiopia  7  Latvia  2 
Colombia 97  France  7  Liberia  2 
Israel  58  Rwanda  7 Macedonia 2 
Iraq 49  Venezuela  7  Malaysia  2 
Yemen  49  Cambodia  6 Netherland 2 
Algeria  47  Ireland  6 Panama 2 
Pakistan  45  Italy  6 Switzerland 2 
Angola 41 Jordan  6  Armenia  1 
Russian  F.  33  Bangladesh  5 Croatia 1 
Spain  31  Ecuador  5 Czech  Rep. 1 
Turkey 28  Iran  5  Emirates  1 
Nigeria 26 Japan  5  Eritrea  1 
Sri Lanka  25  Lebanon  4  Guinea  1 
Peru 22  Sudan  4  Honduras  1 
Sierra  Leone  21  U.S.  4 Libya 1 
Egypt  19  Austria  3 Morocco 1 
Philippines 19  Nepal  3  Nicaragua  1 
Greece 11  Argentina  2  Norway  1 
Indonesia 11  Azerbaijan 2  Poland  1 
Tadjikistan 11  Bolivia  2  Senegal  1 
Burundi  10  Chad  2 Sweden 1 
Uganda  10  Chile  2 Tanzania 1 
Georgia  9  China  2 Thailand 1 
Saudi Arabia  9  El Salvador  2  Tunisia  1 
U.K.  9 Germany 2  Zambia  1 
South  Africa  8 Kenya 2     





Table A.2: Summary Statistics 
 
  N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Number of events  176  0  400  8.38  36.25 
Population  176  19850  1224587494.40 32253573.83  120880525.64 
GDP per capita  176  96.86  38952.22  5495.69  8350.54 
ODA per capita  176  0  490.45  52.96  77.40 
ODA  (% of GDP)  176  0  86.43  7.24  11.69 
Secondary School 
Enrollment  (% gross) 
176  5.50  151.33  67.07  32.90 
Under-5 Infant Mortality 
Rate (per 1000) 
176  4.525  290.95  67.713  67.027 
 
Source: Computed from Table A.1 and World Development Indicators on Line. 
 
A.3: Additional Estimates 
 
Table A.3: Number of Terrorist Events Originating From Each Country 
(Without the Dummy Variables) 
 
  Equation A.1    Equation A.2 
Variables Coefficient  z-Statistics  p-Value Coefficient  z-Statistics  p-Value 
Intercept   1.840  3.36  0.001   1.794  3.28  0.001 
GDP  p.c.  -8.31E-05 -2.81  0.005  -6.04E-05 -1.98  0.048 
ODA (% GDP)   -.026  -1.08  0.280  -  -  - 
ODA  p.c.  - - -   .003  1.11  0.267 
Secondary Enrollment  
(%  gross)  .012 1.45  0.147  .006 0.61  0.540 
Nb.  Obs.  176     176    
Pseudo-R² 0.007     0.008    
LR-Stat  6.05   0.109  6.26   0.0995 
 






Table A.4: Number of Terrorist Events Originating From Each Country 
(With Tertiary Education Variable) 
 
  Equation A.3    Equation A.4 
Variables Coefficient  z-Statistics  p-Value   Coefficient  z-Statistics p-Value 
Intercept  3.025 7.63 0.000    3.197 7.65 0.000 
GDP  p.c.  -0.001 -2.89 0.004    -8.4E-05  -2.23 0.026 
ODA (% GDP)  -.091  -2.91  0.004    -  -  - 
ODA  p.c. - - -    -.019  -4.68  0.000 
Tertiary Enrollment  
(%  Gross)  -.028 -2.15 0.031    -.024 -1.72 0.085 
West B. Gaza  5.652  2.56  0.010  8.376 3.76 0.000 
"CampDavid"  3.829 2.34 0.020    6.870 4.06 0.000 
Sub-Saharan -.336 -0.50 0.614    -1.224 -2.52 0.012 
OECD  2.409 2.28 0.023    1.239 1.29 0.196 
Nb.  Obs. 164       164    
Pseudo-R²  0.055       0.067    
LR-Stat 42.04  0.000    51.44  0.000 
 
Note: Equation A.3 and A.4 are negative binomial regressions estimated by maximum likelihood 
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